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Abstract
This paper takes the parameters in central bank loss functions as fundamental preferences
to be estimated from the data.  It is these preferences (along with target values) that
define the policy regime in operation and that potentially change with senior central bank
appointments.  Optimizing central banks apply policy rules whose feedback coefficients
are functions of its preferences.  Consequently, under some conditions, it is possible to
back out estimates of the preference parameters from estimated policy reaction functions.
This paper establishes conditions under which a policy regime can be identified and
illustrates these conditions using a number of popular models.
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1) Introduction
Modern analyses of central bank behavior begin with a policy objective function and
construct policy rules by optimizing the objective function subject to a system of
constraints.  Descriptions of actual central bank behavior can also be obtained by
estimating policy reaction functions directly.  For the United States, Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (1998), Fuhrer (1997), and Judd and Rudebusch (1998) have all estimated
reaction functions for the Federal Reserve.  Taylor (1993) also developed a rule
describing Federal Reserve policy decisions, popularly known as the Taylor rule.  Clearly
these estimated policy reaction functions and those developed through optimization are
not unrelated.  Optimal policy rules set the policy instrument as a linear function of the
state vector.  The feedback coefficients in these optimal rules are nonlinear functions of
the parameters in the model constraining the optimization, as well as the parameters in
the policy objective function.  In principle it is these nonlinear parameter combinations
that applied studies estimate.
A better understanding of monetary policy decisions can be had if the monetary
authority’s preferences can be disentangled and extracted from estimated policy rules.
With these preferences in hand we would know which variables enter the policy objective
function; which aspects of the economy the central bank is concerned about; and how
senior central bank appointments affect the policy regime in operation.  Because they
relate directly to the policy regime in place, policy preferences, not estimated policy
rules, are more informative of the objectives and incentives underpinning policy
decisions.
Given a plausible economic model, and provided the estimated policy rule is the outcome
of a constrained optimization process, it should be possible to find objective function
parameters such that the optimal rule closely resembles the estimated rule.  Of course, if
these implied policy objective function parameters are to be informative it is important
that the model constraining central bank behavior realistically capture the relationships at3
work in the economy.  The objective of this paper is to present conditions under which a
policy regime in operation can be uncovered from the data.
1
One of the most common objective functions employed in the monetary policy rules
literature defines loss in terms of a linear combination of the unconditional variances of a
vector of economic variables.
2  To formalize this, let zt be a vector of economic variables,
including the policy instrument(s).
3  W e  a s s u m e  t h a t  zt is weakly stationary with
unconditional mean vector z
*
t.  Each element in zt has its counterpart in z
*
t.  Without loss
of generality z
*
t is taken to equal the null vector.
4  Further, it is assumed that policy
makers target the unconditional mean of zt, and therefore that z
*
t is also the target vector.
With this notation every variable in zt has a nominal target value.  Of course, for many of
these variables zero weight may be applied to their deviations from target in the objective
function.
Denote the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of zt by Ω .  Let W be a symmetric,
positive semi-definite, matrix of policy weights; Ω  and W share the same dimensions.
The infinite horizon policy objective function is: Loss[0,∞ ] = tr[WΩ ], where ‘tr’ is the
trace operator.  In many applications W is a diagonal matrix.  Given this objective
function, a policy regime is defined by the matrix of policy weights (preferences), W, and
the vector of targets, z
*
t.  It is the elements in this W matrix that we seek to identify.
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 develops the general economic
structure within which subsequent analysis takes place.  Using this general economic
                                                
1  Soderlind (1999) estimates the parameters in an objective function using a model of the
United States.  He does not consider identification however.
2  See, for example, Ball (1999), Svensson (1999), Svensson (1998), Fair and Howrey
(1996), Rudebusch and Svensson (1998), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), Fuhrer
(1997), and Bharucha and Kent (1998), among others.
3  Throughout this paper we use bolded capitals for matrices, bolded lowercase for
vectors, and lowercase for scalars.
4  Normalizing z
*
t to equal zero is without loss of generality when policy decisions are
constrained by a system of linear equality constraints.  This normalization is not
appropriate if some of the constraints are inequality constraints, such as a constraint
preventing the nominal interest rate from going negative.4
framework section 3 systematically examines the conditions under which policy
preferences can be identified.  To illustrate how the identification conditions are applied
in practice section 4 considers several popular models and examines whether their
structure permits identification of the policy regime.  Section 5 concludes.
2) A General Macroeconomic Setting
Consider the following macroeconomic specification:
t t 3 1 t 2 1 t 1 t 0 v x A y A y A y A + + + = + − − 1 t E, vt ~ iid[0, Σ ]( 1 )
where yt is an n× 1 vector of economic variables, xt a p× 1 vector of policy instruments, vt
an n× 1 vector of stochastic innovations, and Et-1 is the mathematical expectations
operator conditional upon information set It-1, where It = {yt, xt, It-1}.  Matrices A0, A1,
A2, and A3 contain structural parameters with dimensions conformable with yt and xt as
needed.  An alternative specification would have the expectations in (1) formed using
period t rather than period t-1 information.  More will be said about this alternative
specification later, particularly in section 4.  Specification (1) is more general than may
first appear.  Models with complicated lag and lead structures can be manipulated into
this form (Binder and Pesaran, 1995).  Variables that are predetermined and time changes
in policy instruments can be included in yt.
Assumption one: The instrument vector, xt, is set as a linear function of the state vector,
yt-1.
Policy therefore follows the rule:
1 t t \ x − = ,( 2 )5
where the p× n matrix Ψ  contains the policy feedback coefficients.  Where necessary, lags
of the instrument vector enter into this rule through yt-1.  It is desirable to allow some
elements of Ψ  to equal zero or be otherwise restricted, thereby accommodating simple
rules.  Let the unrestricted elements of Ψ  be represented by the (b× 1) vector ϕ .
Defining zt = [yt
T xt
T]
T and combining (1) and (2) produces the system:
t 1 t 2 1 t 1 t 0 u z B z B z B + + = + − − 1 t E. ut ~ iid[0, Ξ ]( 3 )
Clearly zt has dimensions (n+p)× 1, and hence Ω  and W are (n+p)× (n+p) matrices.  The
central bank’s behavior is formalized as follows:
Assumption two: The monetary authority operates under the regime: W, z
*
t = 0 ∀  t, and
selects the unique ϕ  ∈  Q ⊂  ℜ
b, that minimizes Loss[0,∞ ] = tr[WΩ ], subject to
(3).
3) Identifying the Policy Preference Matrix
This section is central to the paper.  It provides necessary and sufficient conditions for
identification of the policy preference matrix W.  Before turning to the details of these
identification conditions, which are presented in a sequence of propositions, it is useful to
underline from the outset what is known and what is to be determined.
Substituting (2) into (1) gives:
t 1 t 2 1 t 3 1 t 0 v y A y A A y A + + + = + − − 1 t E ) (. ( 4 )
The solution to (4) takes the form (see McCallum, 1983, or Uhlig, 1999):6
t 2 1 t 1 t v y y + = − ,( 5 )
where Π 2 = A0
-1 and Π 1 satisfies:
2
1 2 3 1 1 0 A A A A + + = .( 6 )
It is assumed that the reduced form parameters, Π 1, and the feedback coefficients in the
policy rule, Ψ , are known.
Identification problems arise on several levels: first because the system is simultaneous;
second because rational expectations terms are present; and third because the system is
subject to control.  As a consequence the identification strategy proposed below is a
recursive one.  At its most simplistic the identification problem is one of imposing
enough structure on the system so that estimates of the structural parameters can be
backed out from the reduced form.
5
For ease of exposition, define:
A A C 3 1 + =
def
.
This C matrix is a commingling of the parameters applied to the state vector in equation
(4).  Now, variance-covariance matrix restrictions aside, (6) implies:
[] [ ] [ ] [ ] 0 H I A C A
1
1















where, in matrix form
                                                
5  Identification of simultaneous systems is analyzed thoroughly in Fisher (1966).
Pesaran (1988) examines identification in rational expectations models.7
[] [ ] [] [] A
I








= .( 8 )
3.1) Step One
The first step in the recursive identification strategy involves identifying H in equation
(7).  Necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying H are summarized in:
Proposition one: Let the parameters in the i’th row of H, hi (1× 3n), be subject to ‘ri’
linear inhomogeneous restrictions, hiRi = ri, where Ri has dimensions (3n× ri),
then a necessary condition for identifying H is ri  ≥  2n, ∀  i ∈  [1,…,n].  A
sufficient condition for identifying H is rank[Γ  Ri] = 3n, ∀  i ∈  [1,…,n].
Proof:
The row vector hi is subject to the following linear inhomogeneous restrictions:
[] [ ][ ] i i i r R h = .( 9 )
Combining (7) with (9) produces:
[] [ ][ ] i i i r 0 R h = .
The dimensions of hi, Γ , and Ri are 1× 3n, 3n× n, and 3n× ri respectively.  Accordingly, hi
contains 3n parameters jointly subject to n+ri restrictions.  The restrictions in (9) include
the normalization restriction arising when a dependent variable is chosen.  Consequently,
identifying hi necessarily requires ri ≥  2n.  For these linear inhomogeneous restrictions to
be sufficient requires [Γ  Ri] to be such that rank[Γ  Ri] = 3n (see Fisher, 1966).
❚8
Proposition one is very intuitive.  In a standard simultaneous equations system without
rational expectations identifying an equation requires at least as many restrictions be
imposed as there are endogenous variables (ri ≥  n).  With the rational expectations term
present each equation has an additional ‘n’ parameters to identify, but the number of
reduced form parameters available is unchanged.  It directly follows that ‘n’ additional
restrictions must be imposed to achieve identification.
3.2) Step Two
While proposition one provides conditions under which H is identified, and identification
of H implies identification of C, it does not separately identify A1 and A3.  This leads to:
Proposition two: Let the i’th row of A, ai (1× (n+p)), be subject to ‘qi’ linear
inhomogeneous restrictions, aiQi = qi, where Qi has dimensions ((n+p)× qi), then a
necessary condition for identifying A is qi  ≥  p, ∀  i ∈  [1,…,n].  A sufficient
condition for identifying A is that rank[Λ  Qi] = n+p, ∀  i ∈  [1,…,n].
Proof:
From equation (8):
[] [] []C A = . (10)
Assume further that ai is subject to ‘qi’ restrictions of the form:
[] [ ][] i i i q Q a = . (11)
Combining (10) and (11) gives:
[] [ ][ ] i i i i q C Q a = .9
The dimensions of ai,  Λ , and Qi are 1× (n+p), (n+p)× n, and (n+p)× qi respectively.
Therefore  ai contains n+p parameters that are collectively subject to n+qi linear
restrictions. Consequently, a necessary condition for identification is qi ≥  p.  A sufficient
condition for identification of ai is rank[Λ  Qi] = n+p.
❚
In terms of the recursive identification strategy the role of proposition two is to
disentangle the elements in A3 from those in A1.  The elements in these two matrices are
mingled because monetary policy is set conditional upon the state vector.  In words
propositions two states that a necessary condition for identification is that a restriction on
the elements in A1 and A3 be imposed for each control variable in the system.  Clearly if
an equation contains all state variables and an instrument is set as a linear function of all
of the state variables, then the coefficient in A3 associated with that instrument in that
equation cannot be identified.
3.3) Step Three
Thus far in the identification strategy information contained in the policy feedback matrix
Ψ  has not been used.  As long as the rank conditions of proposition one and two hold,
then information in the reduced form coefficients, Π 1 is sufficient to identify all the
coefficients in the structural model.  In this final identification step we introduce Ψ .  If Ψ
is determined optimally, then its elements will be nonlinear functions of the structural
parameters (A0, A1, A2, and A3), and also W.  Provided the structural parameters are
identified a crucial ingredient in Ψ  is known.  This third and final step establishes
necessary and sufficient conditions under which knowledge of Ψ  and the structural
parameters can be used to identify W.  These conditions are summarized in:
Proposition three: Let the column vector w = vech(W) be subject to ‘s’ linear
inhomogeneous restrictions, S
Tw = s, then a necessary condition for global10
identification of W is:  b





) 1 )( (
.  A sufficient condition for
global identification of W is: rank[J(w
**)
T S]
T = k = [(n+p)(n+p+1)/2], ∀  w
** ∈  P
⊂  ℜ
k
+, P convex, where J(w
**) is the Jacobian of the transform f: P →  Q defined
below.
Proof:
In its most general form W is a square, symmetric, matrix containing (n+p)
2 parameters.
Symmetry reduces the number of independent parameters in W to [(n+p)(n+p+1)]/2.  In
what follows let k = [(n+p)(n+p+1)/2].
An outcome of the policy optimization is a continuously differentiable function f: P →  Q
relating the policy preferences to the coefficients in the policy rule:
6
) f(w = . (12)
Recall that ϕ  is a (b× 1) vector containing the elements of Ψ  that are unrestricted.  w is
also subject to ‘s’ linear inhomogeneous restrictions of the form:
s w S =
T . (13)
The policy objective function is only defined up to a scalar allowing one element of w to
be normalized upon.  This normalizing restriction is subsumed into (13).  Remaining
restrictions on w are most likely to take the form of exclusion restrictions, particularly on
the covariance elements of Ω .  The non-linearity of (12) complicates identification.  From
the mean value theorem there exists a w
** between w
* and w, each elements of P, such
that:
                                                
6 The structural parameters have been subsumed into the functional form.11
) )( ( w w w J
* * * * − + = , (14)
where J(w
**) is an b× k Jacobian matrix.  Combining (13) and (14) allows the restrictions
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T . (15)
From (15) a sufficient condition for global identification of w is rank[J(w
**)
T S]
T = k, ∀
w
** ∈  P (see Rothenberg, 1971).  Notice, however, that ∀  n, p > 0, k > np ≥  b.  Therefore,
rank[J(w
**)] is at most ‘b’, which implies that a necessary condition for global
identification is s ≥  k–b, or after substituting for k,  b
2





The necessary condition of proposition three has a clear interpretation: the ‘b’
coefficients in ϕ  can be used to identify at most ‘b’ elements in W.  An interesting aspect
of proposition three is that the Jacobian matrix J(w
**) itself need not have full rank for all
w
** ∈  P.  A singularity in the Jacobian matrix means that there is no information in the
functional relationship between w and ϕ  to tie down one or more parameters in w.
However, provided this lack of information in J(w
**) can be offset by additional outside
information in the form of additional columns in S identification is still possible.
3.4) In Addition…
Of course equation (2) implies that the relationship between the policy instruments and
the predetermined variables is a deterministic one.  Rarely would this be the case.  In
practice the information set used by agents to form their expectations, and that an
econometrician uses when estimating policy reaction functions, may only be a subset of
that available to the monetary authority when it sets policy.  This can arise if the
monetary authority uses a more recent information set than other agents.  Where this is12
the case deviations between the actual path of xt and that predicted by (2) are to be
expected.  These deviations are accommodated by adding a p× 1 innovation vector et,
uncorrelated with vt and yt-1, to equation (2) giving:
t 1 t t e \ x + = − . (16)
Intuitively, adding this innovation vector facilitates identification of A1 and A3 because it
automatically imbues xt with volatility absent from yt-1.  The addition of the policy
innovation term leads to:
Proposition four: Given (1) and (16) A1 and A3 are identified provided the rank condition
of proposition one holds.
Proof:
Substituting (16) into (1) produces:
t t 3 1 t 2 1 t 3 1 t 0 v e A y A y A A y A + + + + = + − − 1 t E ) ( . (17)
Equation (16) is identified because it contains only predetermined variables and therefore
both Ψ  and et are assumed to be known.  The rational expectations solution to (17) takes
the form:
t 3 t 2 1 t 1 t e v y y + + = − , (18)
where Π 2 = A0
-1, Π 1 satisfies (6), and Π 3 = A0
-1A3.  The reduced form parameter matrices
Π 1 and Π 3 are known and the solution to (17) asserts that once A0 is identified so too is
A3.  Proposition one presents a sufficient condition for A0 to be identified.
❚13
Finally, we may wonder how these identification conditions would be affected if the
expectations in (1) were formed using period t rather than period t-1 information.  It is
not difficult to show that provided variance-covariance matrix restrictions are not used
for identification, and provided the policy rule continues to depend only on yt-1 and does
not contain vt, propositions one - four remain unaffected.  The intuition behind this result
is that the solution for Π 1 is unaltered by the change to period t information.  The solution
for Π 2 does change, but it is not required for identification provided vt does not enter the
policy rule.
4) Some Examples
This section takes some popular models from the literature and examines whether they
satisfy the conditions necessary for identification of policy regimes.  The aims of this
section are twofold.  First the section aims to illustrate how propositions one, two, and
three are applied in practice.  Second, the section aims to investigate the suitability of
various models as vehicles for identifying policy regimes.
All models considered contain the variables: yt, π t, and it, representing the output gap,
inflation and the nominal interest rate respectively, and as a consequence the policy
objective function used throughout this section is taken to be:
] Var[i ] ￿9DU>\ (1 ] 9DU> ] Loss[0, t t t σ + − + = ∞ .
Accordingly, the systems examined require that we identify just two policy preference
parameters.  As such, for each system S has four independent columns implying s = 4.
4.1) Example One
Consider the following system:14
t 1 t 1 t t 1 t t g ] E >L y y + − − = + − − β , (19)
t 1 t 1 t t u \ + + = − − , (20)
1 t 1 t y t y i − − + = . (21)
Equation (19) is a dynamic IS curve, (20) an accelerationist Phillips curve, and (21) the
policy reaction function.  The stochastic terms - gt and ut - are assumed to be finite
variance white noise processes.  Observe first that equations (20) and (21) are identified
in so much as for them the rank conditions of propositions one and two hold.  For
subsequent identification of other coefficients the coefficients in equations (20) and (21)
are assumed known.  Next note that with two feedback parameters in (21) and two
independent policy preference coefficients the necessary condition of proposition three is
satisfied.  It just remains to be seen whether propositions one and two hold when applied
to (19).
In terms of equation (4) an unconstrained representation of (19) takes the form:
t 1 t 1 t 2 1 t 1 t 1 1 t 2 1 t 1 t 2 t 1 g E y E c y c y + + + + + = + − + − − − . (22)
The system (19) – (21) has n = 2 and p = 1.  Therefore, the order condition of proposition
one requires that (19) place at least four restrictions (ri ≥  2n) on the structure of (22).
Relative to (22), equation (19) imposes: η 1 = 1; η 2 = 0; ρ 1 = 0; and ρ 2 = c2/ϕ π .  Thus
proposition one’s order condition for identification is satisfied.
Proposition two requires the number of restrictions on the elements of A1 and A3
associated with the IS curve be greater than or equal to the number of policy instruments.
It is useful to rewrite (22) as:
t t 1 t 1 t 2 1 t 1 t 1 1 t 2 1 t 1 t 2 t 1 g L E y E y y + + + + + + = + − + − − − . (23)
In light of (23), the restrictions on the IS curve’s structural parameters take the form:15


















Provided π t-1 enters the policy reaction function non-trivially (ϕ π  ≠ 0) the rank condition
of proposition two is satisfied.
7  In this system the policy regime can be identified.
4.2)  Example Two
The second example is adapted from McCallum (1997) and consists of the following
equations for the output gap and inflation:
t 1 t 1 t t 1 t 1 t t g ] E >L y E y + − − = + − + −  (24)
t t 1 t 1 t t u \ E + + = + − . (25)
















































McCallum’s system is completed by the addition of the policy reaction function:
1 t u 1 t g t u g i − − + = . (26)
                                                
7  Notice that ϕ y can equal zero, but not ϕ π , and the system is still identified.  Thus the
optimal simple inflation rule  1 t t i − = can still be examined.  A policy rule where the
interest rate responds only to the output gap might usually be expected to lead to nominal
indeterminacy.  In this model it produces an unidentified system.  Moreover, with only
one parameter in the policy rule the order condition for proposition three is not met so the
two policy preference parameters cannot be identified.16
Analogous to example one the policy reaction function (26) is identified and contains two
feedback coefficients.  With only two independent parameters in the policy objective
function proposition three’s order condition is meet.  Unfortunately neither (24) nor (25)
are identified.  In unrestricted form equation (25) has the form:
1 t 4 1 t 3 1 t 2 1 t 1 t 4 t 3 t 2 t 1 u g y u g y − − − − + + + + + + =
t 1 t 1 t 4 1 t 1 t 3 1 t 1 t 2 1 t 1 t 1 u u E g E y E E
−
+ − + − + − + − + + + + + . (27)
Comparing equation (25) with (27) the independent restrictions imposed on (27) are:
η 1=1; η 3=0; η 4=0; λ1=0; λ2=0; λ3 = 0; ρ 1=1; ρ 2=0; ρ 3=0; and ρ 4=0.  These restrictions
number ten while the order condition of proposition one requires only eight restrictions.
In terms of this necessary condition equation (25) is over-identified.  Appearances are
deceiving, however.  For while equation (25) satisfies proposition one’s order condition it
fails the rank condition.  To see this, observe that the restrictions listed exclude π t-1, yt-1,
and gt-1 from the system.  At the same time the rational expectations solution to the
system expresses π t and yt in terms of just ut-1, also excluding
8 π t-1 y t-1, and gt-1.  Thus
three of the columns in the [Γ  Ri] matrix associated with (25) depend linearly on the
others and [Γ  Ri] has rank = 11 < 12 (3n, where n = 4).  In a similar vein it can be shown
that equation (24) is also unidentified.
4.3)  Example Three
Our final example comes from Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and is of the same genre
to those just analyzed.  It differs, however, in that the persistence in the system is
endogenous, determined by lagged dependent variables, and not exogenous, driven by
autocorrelated shocks.  In fact the shocks gt and ut are assumed to be finite variance white
noise processes.
                                                
8  That all elements in Π 1 associated with π t-1 and yt-1 equal zero is clear because these
two variables do not appear in the system’s structure and hence only enter the system’s17
t 1 t 1 t t 1 t 1 t 1 t t g ] E >L y ￿( (1 \ y + − − − + = + − + − − (28)
t t 1 t 1 t 1 t t u \ ￿( (1 + + − + = + − − (29)
1 t 1 t y t y i − − + =
Like the previous two examples the order condition of proposition three is satisfied
because the policy reaction function contains two feedback coefficients.  Now consider
equation (28).  In the structure of equation (4), at its most general, equation (28)
becomes:
t 1 t 1 t 2 1 t 1 t 1 1 t 2 1 t 1 t 2 t 1 g E y E c y c y + + + + + = + − + − − − .   (30)
Relative to (28) equation (30) imposes the four restrictions: η 1 = 1; η 2 = 0; c2 = -ρ 2ϕ π ;
and c1 = 1-ρ 1-ρ 2ϕ y, which with n = 2 means that the order condition of proposition one is
met.  Provided neither β  nor δ  equal zero the rank condition is also satisfied.
9  Moreover,
if ϕ π  is non-zero the rank condition of proposition two is also satisfied implying that
equation (28) is identified.  If ϕ π  does equal zero, then the order condition of proposition
three does not hold and the policy preference parameters cannot be identified.
Now consider the Phillips curve, equation (29).  The unrestricted Phillips curve is:
t 1 t 1 t 2 1 t 1 t 1 1 t 2 1 t 1 t 1 t 2 u E y E c y c y + + + + + = + − + − − − (31)
Relative to (31) equation (29) imposes the restrictions: η 2 = 1; c1 = 0; c2 + ρ 2 = 1; and ρ 1
= 0.  These four restrictions satisfy proposition one’s necessary condition for
identification.  Like the IS curve (28), provided neither β  nor δ  equal zero the rank
                                                                                                                                               
state vector trivially.  That the elements associated with gt-1 also equal zero (or for one
equation µ 1) is a consequence of the system being subject to control.
9  When β  = 0, for example, yt-1 is not a state variable in the system and ϕ y appropriately
equals zero.  Consequently, the column of Π 1 associated with yt-1 equals zero, leading to
the rank condition of proposition one failing.18
condition of proposition one is also met.  As a consequence for this system the policy
regime is identifiable.
What these three examples illustrate is that provided we consider only the order condition
for identifying the policy preferences (proposition three) the major obstacle faced when
identifying  W is that of identifying the structure of the economy.  Identifying the
economy’s structure is essential, however, because it constrains the optimization process
leading to the policy rule.
5) Conclusions
The aim of this paper was simple.  We wanted to lay the foundations for estimating
central bank policy preferences by establishing conditions under which these preference
parameters could be identified.  It was demonstrated that optimizing central banks apply
policy rules whose feedback coefficients are nonlinear functions of its policy preferences.
Before these policy preferences can be backed out from these feedback coefficients
several identification conditions need to hold.  As a consequence this paper proposes a
recursive identification strategy consisting of three steps.  The first two steps,
summarized in propositions one and two, identify the parameters in the structural model
constraining the central bank’s optimization.  Only once the structural model is identified
can enough structure be placed on the policy reaction function to disentangle the policy
preference coefficients.  Proposition three provides necessary and sufficient conditions
for the policy preference coefficients to be identified.
To illustrate how the conditions developed in propositions one, two and three are applied
in practice three examples were provided and their identification properties examined.
The identification conditions developed in this paper are important because only by
identifying and estimating the policy regime in operation can we tell what the objectives
of the monetary authority truly are.  In particular, this paper serves to emphasize that it is
not necessarily possible to say anything meaningful about a policy regime purely on the19
basis of an estimated policy rule.  Future work will seek to identify and estimate actual
policy regimes in operation, and to document how these policy regimes have changed
over time.20
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